

# POLAR CAPITAL HOLDINGS PLC

## 2008 Interim Results

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**December 2008**



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
## Section II

- Financial Overview

# Asset Management Barbell

*Polarisation between 'cheap' and 'alternatives/spicy'*

Move to alternatives driven initially by modern portfolio theory – the efficient frontier, low correlation and superior risk adjusted returns.



Source: Morgan Stanley Research – September 2 2008


# Rapid Growth of Hedge Fund Industry

*Leads to bubble*

Growing Asset Class  
Data as at March 31st, 2008

300 hedge funds in the early 1990s; nearly 10,000 by 2008.

In 2009: \$1,000mm?




Source: Morgan Stanley Research – March 2008


# Changing nature of hedge fund allocation

*Lots of new strategies*

Hedge Funds by Style and Strategy in 1990



Hedge Funds by Style and Strategy in 2007



Source: Morgan Stanley Research – March 2008

# What has gone wrong?

- **No barriers to entry:** Industry took off post 2001 bear market; too many entrants driven by greed rather than desire to be “guardians of capital”.
- **Investors as well as hedge fund managers bear responsibility:** Competition for returns versus meeting client expectations; confusion between alpha and beta; and insufficient transparency. All lead to too much correlation and directionality.
- **Managers not up to the task:** Too little regard for macro environment and for risk management; no real ability to short stocks; too much leverage and focus on less liquid strategies.
- **Poor performance and redemptions:** Hedge fund industry performance is down about 20% year to date. This has led to redemptions which across the industry could be around 30-40%.
  - Investor expectations not met.
  - Pre-emptive redemptions and game theory.
  - Counterparty risk.
  - Deleveraging and shortage of cash.

# Absolute return is still a very valid diversification

- **Economic outlook supportive of a cautious approach:** a multi year deleveraging cycle and the need for banks to rebuild capital suggests 2-5 years of negative and/or below trend growth. Risks of 1930s style depression still a possibility and volatility likely to remain high.
- **Risk adjusted performance:** Despite 2008 industry performance hedge fund returns in relative and risk adjusted terms are impressive versus a long only equity approach. Hedge fund industry performance should generate 7% real return over a cycle with less volatility and low correlation to equity markets.
- **Hedge fund industry matures:** The hedge fund industry will mature, professionalise and consolidate enormously. The events of 2007/8 will ensure a far more professional industry at all levels.
- **Absolute return allocations to increase:** Demand for strategies focused on capital preservation and absolute return will increase, driven by all investors, but especially retail and large institutions.

# Risk/Return Characteristics Across Asset Classes

1990 – 2008

## Risk and Return

Data from Jan 2000 to Jun 2008

	Annualised Compound Rate of Return	Annualised Standard Deviation	Return/Volatility
MSCI World Equity Index	4.88%	13.47%	0.36
JPM Global Government Bond Index	6.76%	3.20%	2.11
HFRI Fund of Funds	9.56%	5.54%	1.72

## Correlations


	Equities	Bonds	Hedge Funds
Equities	1.00		
Bonds	0.02	1.00	
Hedge Funds	0.50	0.04	1.00



# Hedge funds still underweighted in portfolio allocations of many investors


“Endowment Envy” has in part driven a massive shift to ‘alternatives’, particularly in private equity and increasingly in HFoF, and global equity and fixed income in US institutional

Allocations to Alternatives strong...



Source: Morgan Stanley Research – September 2 2008

...within alternatives hedge FoF share increasing – although private equity has been dominant in US alternative flows




# Overview of Polar Capital


## Assets under management

At 28 December 2007, assets under management totalled \$3.6bn split as follows:

AuM split by strategy (28 December 2007)




AuM split by business unit (28 December 2007)




At 28 November 2008, assets under management totalled \$2.5bn split as follows:

AuM split by strategy (28 November 2008)



AuM split by business unit (28 November 2008)



# Overview of Polar Capital

*Unaudited AUM flows\**

		\$bn
<b>AUM @ 31 March 2008</b>		<b>\$3.14bn</b>
Gross inflows to 30 Nov 2008	0.73	
Gross outflows to 30 Nov 2008 ( <i>excluding fund closures</i> )	<u>(0.49)</u>	
Net flows from ongoing business to 30 Nov 2008		0.24
Fund Closures		(0.34)
Performance		
Long Performance	-0.18	
Hedge Performance	<u>0.03</u>	
Net Performance		(0.15)
Currency gain/(loss)		<u>(0.36)</u>
<b>AUM @ 30 Nov 2008*</b>		<b><u><u>\$2.53bn</u></u></b>

\*Note that the regular quarterly disclosure in mid January 2009 will document position for quarter ending December 2008.

# Overview of Polar Capital

## Performance


Fund	Fund Size Nov 30 <sup>th</sup> 2008	Launch Date	Performance Calendar 2007	Performance YTD*	Volatility	Index YTD*
	\$m					
<b>Hedge Funds</b>						
UK **	105	Nov 2001	3.27%	4.26%	6.10	MSCI Europe -43.26%
European Forager	292	Aug 2003	11.85%	-13.97%	8.80	FTSE 100 -33.60%
European Conviction	174	Mar 2006	5.56%	8.21%	11.90	MSCI Emerging Markets -56.71%
Paragon	875	Mar 2004	15.76%	17.93%	17.90	Tremont Long/Short -19.46%
Discovery**	174	May 2006	14.36%	11.02%	6.40	Dow Jones World Technology -47.11%
Elbrus	109	Apr 2006	36.08%	-50.95%	21.60	Tokyo Stock Price (TOPIX) -32.06%
Latin America	22	May 2006	23.57%	3.74%	11.30	
<b>Long Only</b>						
Technology Trust	339	Feb 2001	0.33%	-29.54%		
Japan UCITS**	339	Oct 2001	-7.88%	-20.90%		
Global Technology UCITS**	53	Oct 2001	3.36%	-47.51%		
Healthcare Opportunities UCITS	66	Dec 2007	N/A	-27.01%		
<b>Index Volatility</b>						
						MSCI Europe 22.84
						MSCI Europe Small Cap 32.96
						MSCI EM Equity 44.09

• Indicative figures to the 30 November 2008

\*\* Fund size includes mandates run off the same strategy

# Overview of Polar Capital

## Performance



# Polar's Competitive Positioning

*As strong as it ever has been*

- Highly differentiated performance of funds.
- Significant shrinkage in number of competing funds.
- Incentivisation in place with funds at/near high water marks.
- Distress at a time of significant opportunity.
- Relative stability of the 'fundamental research driven' approach.
- Integrity and low profile of the model.
- Strong operating infrastructure positions the business well for changes in the operating and regulatory environment.

# Competitive Differentiation

*Best performing hedge funds*

## Barron's First Ranking of the World's Best Performance Hedge Funds

Three year net performance (through June 30, 2007)

	Fund	Assets (m)	3 yr cum. av.	H1 07	2008 YTD
1	RAB Special Situations	2267	47,69	17,93	-67%
2	The Children's Investment Fund	5000	44,27	15,72	-32%
3	Highland CDO Opportunity	463	43,98	14,53	CLOSED
4	BTR Global Opportunity, Class D	279	43,42	31,38	NA
5	SR Phoenicia	1200	43,10	20,50	-48%
6	Atticus European	8190	40,76	3,65	-40%
7	Gradient Europe Fund A	2200	39,18	8,33	-75%
8	Polar Capital Paragon Absolute Return	531	38,00	6,39	+21%
9	Paulson Enhanced Partners	2775	37,97	55,18	+29%
10	Firebird Global	733	37,18	17,11	-67%

Source: Barron's

# Strategy for Growth

## Plan for 2009

- Focus on growth of existing funds.

Capacity and Growth Prospects	
Paragon	\$1500mm
Conviction	\$750mm
Forager	\$500mm
Discovery	\$1000mm
UK UCITS3	\$500mm
Latam	\$250mm
<b>HEDGE TOTAL</b>	<b>\$4500mm</b>
Japan	\$600mm
Technology	\$600mm
Healthcare	\$300mm
<b>LONG ONLY TOTAL</b>	<b>\$1500mm</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$6000mm</b>

- Some limited and opportunistic recruitment.



# Any Other Business

## *Questions Raised*

- How diverse is the investor base?
- What are the current redemption pressures?
- Will there be pressure on fees?
- What will happen to fund liquidity terms?
- How has Polar managed to deliver this performance?
- Is the business too dependent on the Paragon Fund?
- What is the feedback for investors and potential investors in our funds?

# Summary

- We expect the global economic backdrop to continue to present a very challenging environment.
- Considerable damage has been done to the 'reputation' of the hedge fund industry.
- Polar's competitive positioning is strong.
- Challenges will be to attract assets and boost core profitability.
- This could be a very important inflection point.

# Financial Review

## Highlights for 6 months to 30 September 2008

- **AUM**
  - AUM at 30 September 2008 down 9% to \$2.87bn compared to \$3.14bn at March 2008 (2007: \$3.4bn).
  - Analysis of movements on AUM page.
- **Profitability**
  - Pre-tax profitability down 67% to £1.5m (Sept 2007: £4.5m).
  - Performance fee receipts historically weighted to second six months.
- **EPS and Dividend**
  - Basic undiluted EPS down to 0.59p (2007:3.93p)
  - Adjusted diluted EPS down to 1.25p (2007: 4.46p).  
*Adjustment excludes cost of share based payments*
  - First interim dividend per ordinary share of 1p declared, to be paid in January 2009 (2007: 1.5p).
- **Balance Sheet**
  - £19m of net cash and £15m of investments in own funds.

# Financial Review

## Profits

	2008			2009
	1 <sup>st</sup> Six Months	2 <sup>nd</sup> Six Months	2008 Year	1 <sup>st</sup> Six Months
Core operating profit	3.4	2.6	6.0	0.9
Performance fee profit	0.3	7.7	8.0	--
Interest and similar income	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>
<b>PBT pre IFRS S.B.P.</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>1.5</b>
Share based payments ("S.B.P.")	<u>(0.6)</u>	<u>(0.6)</u>	<u>(1.2)</u>	<u>(0.5)</u>
<b>Statutory PBT</b>	<b>£3.9m</b>	<b>£10.6m</b>	<b>£14.5m</b>	<b>£1.0m</b>

# Financial Review

## Costs

	1 <sup>st</sup> Six Months	2008 2 <sup>nd</sup> Six Months	Year	2009 1 <sup>st</sup> Six Months
Salaries and bonuses	4.9	4.1	9.0	5.1
Core distributions	<u>0.9</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>1.5</u>
	5.8	5.4	11.2	6.6
Performance fee interests	<u>0.6</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>13.0</u>	---
Total cash compensation cost	6.4	17.8	24.2	6.6
Other operating costs	<u>3.4</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>4.0*</u>
<b>Operating Costs before SBP</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>21.9</b>	<b>31.7</b>	<b>10.6</b>
Cost of sales (trail)	1.1	0.8	1.9	0.4
Share based payments ("SBP")	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>0.5</u>
<b>Total Costs</b>	<u><b>£11.5m</b></u>	<u><b>£23.3m</b></u>	<u><b>£34.8m</b></u>	<u><b>£11.5m</b></u>

### Comments

\* Other Operating costs contain cost of £500,000 from the loss made from the Company's investment into its closed Global Utilities fund.

# Financial Review

## *Dividend*

### **Dividend Policy**

- First dividend of 1.0p (2007: 1.5p).
- Dividend reflects:
  - (a) reduced profits
  - (b) historically the first dividend has been the smaller dividend

# Financial Review

*Projection for 12 months to 31 March 2009*

- **AUM**
  - short term redemption pressure
  - strength of dollar has ameliorated reduction in AUM.
- **Core AMC Profitability**
  - Reduced AUM squeezing core profitability
  - Approx \$2bn threshold level of AUM
- **Performance Fee Profitability**
  - Performance fee payment dates weighted to second half of the year.
  - Net performance fee receipts to end of Nov 2008 are in excess of 50% higher than £3.9m of net receipts received over the same period in 2007.
  - Further performance fees to be earned to March 2009 but are subject to the delivery of performance.

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